Indonesia's Election Brings Forth Foreign Policy Challenges

By
Berzatu Editor
8
8
 min. reading
Jul 3, 2024

In February, Indonesians participated in the largest single-day election globally, installing Prabowo Subianto as their new president. Prabowo now faces tough diplomatic challenges, including rising tensions in the disputed South China Sea and the intensifying rivalry between China and the United States, two of Indonesia’s key partners.

Domestically, the election in the 270-million-strong democracy was not without its challenges. Prabowo, a former army general, secured over 58 percent of the votes cast. A two-time contender in previous presidential elections, he lost both times to Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, before joining Jokowi’s cabinet as defense minister. Previously, Prabowo portrayed himself as a nationalist and strong leader, though some questioned his temperament.

In recent years, Prabowo's image has softened to that of a more benign and “grandfatherly” figure, with his dance moves even gaining popularity on social media. This shift helped alleviate some voters’ concerns about his human rights record. Prabowo, who until recently was banned from entering the U.S., has faced allegations of human rights violations from his time as a special forces commander during the Suharto era, which he denies.

Initially, Jokowi was thought to support Ganjar Pranowo, a former Central Java governor and member of the Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP). Ganjar, seen as a modest and engaging pluralist, was considered a strong candidate to win over the Indonesian public. According to a 2023 survey, among the 81 percent of Indonesians satisfied with Jokowi’s presidency, support for his potential successors was divided between Ganjar (around 40 percent) and Prabowo (30 percent).

Ultimately, Jokowi endorsed Prabowo, and his eldest son Gibran, the mayor of Solo in Central Java, was chosen as Prabowo's running mate. The Prabowo-Gibran administration is expected to continue Jokowi’s mission of constructing the new capital city, Nusantara, in East Kalimantan. Prabowo has openly stated his intention to maintain Jokowi’s policies.

**Democratic Backsliding**

The election's two other contenders challenged the results at the Constitutional Court, citing widespread irregularities. They also contested the inclusion of 36-year-old Gibran on Prabowo’s ticket, pointing to a requirement that vice presidents be at least 40 years old. Gibran benefited from a last-minute exemption by the constitutional court. The court’s chief justice, Jokowi’s brother-in-law, was later removed by an ethics panel for this decision, but the verdict remained binding.

In the lead-up to the election, the government disbursed about $30 billion in social aid, nearly matching the funds allocated during the COVID-19 pandemic and 12 percent higher than the previous year’s social aid.

On April 22, the Constitutional Court confirmed Prabowo's victory, rejecting the appeal and ruling there was no evidence of fraud or state intervention that materially impacted the results. The court also found no evidence that Jokowi's administration bent the laws to support Prabowo.

How Will It Play Out?

Balancing Ties Between the U.S. and China

Jokowi previously secured significant Chinese investments, including $11.5 billion from one of the world’s largest glass makers for a manufacturing plant and the $7.3 billion high-speed railway connecting Jakarta and West Java, reducing travel time from four hours to forty minutes. Prabowo's visit to China soon after the election signals that the bilateral relationship will remain strong.

Indonesia is unlikely to pick sides or formally align with either major power. Prabowo is expected to continue Jokowi's popular policies, as he pledged during his campaign. Jokowi, who avoided openly criticizing either Washington or Beijing, successfully balanced defense cooperation with the former and foreign investment with the latter.

Greater Cooperation with American Efforts to Counter China - probably not.

Despite ongoing military cooperation with Washington, it remains doubtful that Indonesia will host an American military base, unlike the Philippines. Successive Indonesian governments have maintained a free and active foreign policy, non-aligned with any major powers, and support the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) amid great power rivalry.

Prabowo’s past stances have painted a different picture. In 2019, he was critical of Chinese investment in Indonesia, stating he would review such transactions if elected and strongly opposed foreign influence. However, his posture changed after joining Jokowi’s administration as defense minister. For instance, his response to Chinese fishing vessels in Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone in the North Natuna Sea, a clear issue of sovereignty, was seen as mild.

Prabowo will not be sworn into office until October, and his cabinet appointments will significantly influence policy direction. Indonesia’s position in ASEAN will indirectly affect its approach in the South China Sea and its relations with both the U.S. and China. Whether Jokowi’s foreign policy will continue depends on Prabowo’s commitment to his campaign promises.